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Not a Part of Her Sentence:  
APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S JOHNSON V. 
CALIFORNIA TO PRISON ABORTION POLICIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the mainstream reproductive rights movement 
is framed around the concept of choice: the choice to use birth 
control, the choice to have children, and the choice to terminate 
a pregnancy.  Although the freedom to choose abortion is 
central to a woman’s right to control her body, for many women 
reproductive freedom is not a matter of choice.1  Each year, 
thousands of women in the United States cannot choose 
abortion because considerations such as high costs, lack of 
access, and restrictions on welfare present major obstacles to 
the exercise of their reproductive rights.  Nowhere is access to 
abortion more precarious, however, than in prison. Most 
prisons and jails either deny women access to abortion 
outright, or place regulations and restrictions on access that 
effectively deny inmates freedom of choice. Because there are 
few national or state-wide prison abortion policies, the 
reproductive rights of women in prison are subject to the whim 
of politicians, prison administrators, judges, and prison doctors, 
who decide whether to allow female inmates to terminate their 
pregnancies, or whether the inmates will carry their 
pregnancies to term. As the population of women in prisons 
grows exponentially each year, the lack of reproductive freedom 
for prisoners becomes increasingly problematic.   
  
 1 See Jael Silliman, Introduction to POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY: RACE, 
GENDER AND CRIMINALIZATION, at xi (Jael Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 
South End Press 2002).  
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Prison regulations that deny or restrict inmate 
abortions violate inmates’ right to an abortion under Roe v. 
Wade, and do not pass the Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
prohibition against an “undue burden” on abortion rights.2 
These regulations also violate the Supreme Court’s 
requirement of an exception for the life and health of the 
mother.3 Unfortunately, challenging these policies in the 
judicial system is of little help when courts follow the Supreme 
Court’s Turner v. Safley4 standard for evaluating a prison 
regulation that restricts an inmate’s constitutional rights. 
Under Turner, courts are highly deferential towards prison 
administrators’ choices in policy-making: a prison regulation 
that infringes on a constitutional right is valid if it is 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”5  By 
requiring nothing more than a logical connection between a 
prison regulation and a penological interest, the Supreme 
Court has made this standard into a rational basis review, 
allowing prison administrators great leeway in restricting 
prisoner rights.  
Two cases challenging prison abortion policies in federal 
circuit court, Monmouth County Correctional Institution 
Inmates v. Lanzaro6 and Victoria W. v. Larpenter,7 have applied 
the Turner deferential standard. These two circuits, however, 
came to opposite holdings after applying Turner, resulting in a 
circuit split over whether restrictive prison abortion policies 
  
 2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (finding a state cannot prohibit 
abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the right to an abortion in the first trimester under Roe; 
finding state cannot place an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion 
before viability). 
 3 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (in which the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade’s 
holding that the state can regulate abortion before viability except where it is 
necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother); see also Sternberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 914-16 (2000) (in which the Court struck Nebraska’s ban on so-
called “Partial Birth Abortions” because the law did not include an exception for the life 
and health of the mother).  
 4 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  In addition, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 may make it even more difficult for an inmate to reach federal 
court to challenge prison abortion policies, because the Act requires an inmate to 
exhaust all avenues of administrative relief in the prison before they may sue in 
federal court.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1980).  
 5 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  
 6 Monmouth County Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 338 (3d 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). 
 7 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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are constitutional.8  In Monmouth, New Jersey inmates 
brought a class action suit in federal court challenging a prison 
policy that required a court order to obtain an abortion.9  
Applying Turner, the Third Circuit found the policy was 
unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest and so did not satisfy the Turner 
standard and violated the inmates’ Fourteenth and Eighth 
Amendment rights.10  In Victoria W., decided in May of 2004, 
the Fifth Circuit came to an almost opposite conclusion 
evaluating a very similar abortion policy.11  In Victoria W., an 
individual inmate argued that an analogous policy requiring a 
court order to obtain an abortion violated her Fourteenth and 
Eighth Amendment rights by denying her access to abortion.12  
The Fifth Circuit found that the policy was constitutional 
because it satisfied the Turner standard.13  As a result of these 
two precedents, inmates housed in prisons in the Third Circuit 
have a categorical right to choose abortion, while inmates in 
the Fifth Circuit and other Circuits do not.   
Because the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case 
evaluating a prison abortion policy,14 lower courts are not 
entirely clear as to how and where Turner applies.  
Presumably, Circuit Courts would evaluate a prison abortion 
policy similarly to the Monmouth or Victoria W. courts, by 
using the Turner standard.  Upholding an abortion restriction 
under Turner, however, may have an enormous effect on 
inmates seeking to terminate their pregnancies.  A woman in 
prison may be forced to carry her child to term, thereby 
  
 8 It is important to note, however, one critical difference between these two 
cases.  In the Monmouth case, the plaintiff inmates applied for injunctive relief to order 
the prison to allow abortions for inmates, and to declare the prison’s court order policy 
unconstitutional. Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 328.  In contrast, the inmate in Victoria W. 
sued the jail for civil damages stemming from their denial of her abortion rights due to 
the court order policy. Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 480-81.  A court may be more likely to 
give injunctive relief to an inmate that needs an abortion immediately, than to award 
civil damages to an inmate who was previously denied an abortion because of a prison 
policy.  There are two reported decisions in which district courts provided an 
emergency injunction ordering a prison to allow an inmate access to abortion, and 
there may be numerous unreported cases.  Roe v. Crawford, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1042 
(W.D. Mo. 2005); Roe v. Leis, 2001 WL 1842459 (S.D. Ohio 2001).  
 9 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 328.  
 10 Id. at 344.  
 11 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 485. 
 12 Id. at 481.  
 13 Id. at 478.  
 14 In Monmouth, the Supreme Court denied the government’s petition for 
certiorari, [Monmouth, 486 U.S. at 1006] while in Victoria W., the inmate’s lawyers 
chose not to apply for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  
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changing her and the child’s life forever, in order to conform to 
what a prison administrator regards as a legitimate penological 
interest. This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which 
prohibits regulations on abortions that place an undue burden 
on the right to choose before the fetus attains viability.15  For 
women in prison, the burdens on obtaining an abortion that are 
imposed by prison regulations are too high to be constitutional 
under Casey.  For this reason, abortion restrictions should not 
be evaluated under the Turner deferential standard, but held 
to the Casey “undue burden” standard instead.   
The long-established Turner standard is not 
impenetrable. In 2005, the Supreme Court declined to use 
Turner in a remarkable prisoner rights case that may leave 
room for advocates to argue that applying the deferential 
Turner standard is not constitutional in all situations.  In 
Johnson v. California,16 a case originating in the Ninth Circuit, 
the Supreme Court found that Turner should not be used to 
evaluate a prison’s racial segregation policy, but that instead a 
court should use the strict scrutiny standard it would employ 
for all invidious discrimination based on race.17  Noting that the 
Court applies Turner “only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with 
proper incarceration,’”18 the Johnson decision explicitly 
dispelled the notion that courts must necessarily be deferential 
to prison administrators in all cases.  In fact, the Johnson court 
ordered courts to evaluate whether a right “need necessarily be 
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration,” a 
threshold inquiry that will liberate many cases from the 
Turner test.   
This note submits that, similar to the decision in 
Johnson, Turner should not be used to evaluate prison 
regulations that restrict inmates’ abortion rights. Just as racial 
segregation in prisons should be subject to strict scrutiny, 
prison abortion policies should not be evaluated under Turner; 
instead, they should be evaluated under the Casey “undue 
burden” standard. Turner should not be applied because 
abortion is more similar to rights not evaluated under Turner 
and less similar to rights that are; and because the Supreme 
  
 15 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 16 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).  
 17 Id. at 1148-49. 
 18 Id. at 1149 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (emphasis 
in original)). 
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Court’s Johnson decision dictates that Turner should not be 
applied to abortion policies.  
To provide the reader with context, Part II will present 
an overview of women in prison, outline abortion policies in 
federal and state prisons, and explain how these policies affect 
female inmates.  Part III will describe Turner and its progeny, 
and the standard for evaluating prison regulations that restrict 
constitutional rights.  Part III will also consider Johnson v. 
California, in which the Supreme Court chose not to follow 
Turner in favor of a stricter standard of review. Part IV will 
closely examine Monmouth and Victoria W., the two Court of 
Appeals cases in which inmates challenged abortion policies.  
Part V will argue that Turner should not be applied to review 
prison abortion policies.  Finally, Part VI will submit that 
courts should evaluate prison abortion policies under the Casey 
undue burden standard, and describe how Victoria W. would 
have been decided under Casey. 
Although incarceration necessarily involves 
punishment, the Supreme Court has recognized that inmates 
do retain certain constitutional rights while in prison.19  The 
delicate balance between an inmate’s right to an abortion and a 
prison’s need for security and stability makes evaluating prison 
abortion policies difficult.  However, denying an inmate access 
to abortion is a form of punishment that affects female inmates 
and their families for the rest of their lives. Therefore, forcing 
an inmate to give birth in prison against her wishes is 
unconstitutional, and should not be a part of her sentence.   
II. BACKGROUND: FEMALE INMATES AND PRISON ABORTION 
POLICIES  
Although women are the fastest growing inmate 
population in the country today,20 prisons are still built 
according to a male model in many ways.21  Not only are many 
  
 19 See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: 
Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229 (1998) (describing 
the history of prisoner rights cases in the Supreme Court); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (“[N]o iron curtain [is] drawn between the Constitution and 
the prisons of this country.”). 
 20 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
prisons.htm. 
 21 See Jennifer Arnett Lee, Women Prisoners, Penological Interests, and 
Gender Stereotyping: An Application of Equal Protection Norms to Female Inmates, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251, 252-54 (2000); see also Deborah LaBelle and Sheryl 
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inmates denied medical care that responds to their particular 
needs as women,22 most federal and state prisons have policies 
that restrict or deny abortion access to inmates.23  Part II of 
this note describes state and federal prison abortion policies, 
and the effect these policies have on women in prison and 
children born to incarcerated mothers.  
There are currently more than 180,000 female inmates 
in state or federal correctional institutions in the United 
States.24  The number of female inmates has been increasing 
rapidly in the past decade: between 1990 and 2000, the number 
of women in prison increased by 114 percent.25  Women in 
prison are disproportionately drawn from economically and 
politically disadvantaged populations:26 African-American and 
Hispanic women are far more likely than white women to be 
incarcerated;27 female inmates often do not have a high school 
education when they enter prison;28 they have frequently been 
physically or sexually abused before incarceration;29 and they 
were likely unemployed, or on government assistance, at the 
time of their arrest.30 
  
Pimlott Kubiak, Balancing Gender Equity for Women Prisoners, 30 FEMINIST STUDIES 
2, 416-20 (2004) (“This article explores how the legal right to “substantially equivalent” 
treatment and facilities for female prisoners was jeopardized by an administrative 
interpretation of [] policy as gender neutral, thereby minimizing the gender differences 
the case sought to protect.”); see also NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, 
PRISONS AND SOCIAL CONTROL xii, 195-207 (1997). 
 22 Ellen Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women’s Prisons, 
16-SPG CRIM. JUST. 39, 39 (2001). 
 23 See generally Rachel Roth, Do Prisoners Have Abortion Rights?, 30 
FEMINIST STUDIES 353 (2004) [hereinafter Roth, Do Prisoners]. 
 24 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004 5, 8 (2004), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm 
(stating that the number of women in prison is over 103,000 and the number of women 
in jails is over 86,000).  For this Note, references to state and federal correctional 
institutions include both prisons and jails.  Jails are locally operated correctional 
facilities that confine persons before or after adjudication, often for less than one year.  
Prisons house inmates with longer sentences until they are released on parole or 
probation.  Id. at 7. 
 25 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2001, 5 (2001), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.  
 26 Candace Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women’s Imprisonment, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (2003). 
 27 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, 11 (2004), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.  
 28 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: EDUCATION AND 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 5 (2003), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.  
 29 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PROFILE OF JAIL 
INMATES 2002, 10 (2004), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm. 
 30 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: INCARCERATED PARENTS 
AND THEIR CHILDREN, 10 (2000), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm. 
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An estimated six to ten percent of women enter prison 
or jail pregnant.31  Other women become pregnant while they 
are in prison via illegal relationships with guards, or because 
male guards have raped them.32  For the women in prison 
whose abusers are corrections officers who work at the prison, 
the rate of sexual assault has been estimated to be as high as 
one in four in some facilities.33  Although there are some news 
articles and reports exposing these violations, they are highly 
under-reported by the media.34 
There is no national policy for inmates who wish to 
discontinue their pregnancies, and access to abortion varies 
according to where a woman is incarcerated. The Federal 
Bureau of Prisons governs federal prisons; state governments 
create state prison policies via their state Departments of 
Correction; and jails are run by local municipalities.  Federal, 
  
 31 Bruce Tomaso, Full Term Babies; For Women Who Give Birth in Prison, It’s 
A Hard Time, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1999, at 10.  
 32 See generally, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, Not Part of My Sentence: Violations of 
the Human Rights of Women in Custody, (Mar. 1, 1999), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510011999 (a report that details the 
sexual abuse of female inmates in all fifty states) [hereinafter AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF 
WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 1 (1996) (describing the sexual abuse of female inmates 
in California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan and New York); 
Cindy Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson, Sexual Coercion Reported by 
Women in Three Midwestern Prisons, 39 J. SEX RESEARCH 3, 5 (Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www.spr.org/pdf/Struckman021.pdf.  There are also multiple federal court cases 
that detail sexual abuse of inmates by guards: Beers-Capitol v.  Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 
124-25 (3d Cir. 2001); Downey v. Denton County, Texas, 119 F.3d 381, 383-84 (5th Cir. 
1997); Everson v. Michigan Dep’t of Correct., 391 F.3d 737, 739-41 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Williams v. Prudden, 67 Fed. Appx. 976, 977 (8th Cir. 2003); Berry v. Oswalt, 143 F.3d 
1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998); Giron v. Correct. Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281, 1284 
(10th Cir. 1999); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1304-1305 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Women Prisoners of the D. C. Dept. Correct. v. D. C., 93 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 33 Human Rights Watch, Editorial: Doing Something About Prison Rape, 
September 26, 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/prison092603.htm. 
 34 Gary Craig, Suit Alleges Rampant Female Inmate Abuse, ROCHESTER 
DEMOCRAT AND CHRON., Jan. 29, 2003, at 1A; Joanne Wasserman, Prison Rapes 
‘Routine,’ DAILY NEWS (New York), Jan. 28, 2003, at 8; Tim Smith, Prison Guards 
Indicted in Sex Scandal, THE GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), Apr. 20, 2001, at 1A; Sue Anne 
Pressley, Inmate Sex Scandal Roils South Carolina; ‘Culture of Corruption’ Alleged, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at A3; Steven A. Holmes, With More Women in Prison, 
Sexual Abuse by Guards Becomes Greater Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at 18; 
Ivan Penn, Sex Probe at Detention Center Grows; Correctional Officer Becomes Second 
Placed on Leave; Seven-week Inquiry; Male Officers, Female Inmate Focus of 
Allegations, THE BALT. SUN, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1B; Mary A. Mitchell, ‘Culture of Abuse’ 
Forced Georgia to Close Prison, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 15, 1996, at 5; Toni Locy, Officer 
Describes ‘Auction’ of Female Inmates at D.C. Jail, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at C01; 
Eric Harrison, Nearly 200 Women Have Told of Being Raped, Abused in Georgia Prison 
Scandal So Broad Even Officials Say It’s a 13-Year Nightmare, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
1992, at 1. 
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state and local legislative bodies typically delegate broad 
powers to prison officials in managing prisons and jails.35  In 
addition, very little is known about how prisons regulate 
abortions because oftentimes these policies are unwritten.36  
This means that prisoners and their advocates have few ways 
to organize for the reproductive rights of inmates. 
In the federal prison context, abortion policy is subject 
to congressional control and political lawmaking.  Before 1987, 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons paid for all prisoner abortions.  
In 1987, however, Jesse Helms and other Republicans in 
Congress successfully organized to include a funding ban on 
abortions in a Department of Justice appropriations bill.37  
Today, because of this funding ban, Bureau of Prison policies 
only pay for “medically necessary” abortions, although if the 
inmate’s life is not in danger and she chooses an “elective” 
abortion, federal prisons do make arrangements for travel 
outside the facility.38  Women detained by immigration 
authorities are also under federal jurisdiction and subject to 
the funding ban on abortion.  Therefore, women seeking 
asylum who request an abortion, even those who have been 
raped, may be impeded (or prevented) from seeking abortions.39 
State Departments of Correction have widely varying 
policies on abortion access.  Nine state Departments of 
Correction have official policies providing women with 
essentially unrestricted access to abortion in the first 
trimester.40  Six states and the District of Columbia fund only 
medically necessary abortions.41  In eight states, prisoners have 
  
 35 Rachel Roth, Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoner’s Reproductive 
Rights? 11 SOC. POL. 411, 418 (2004) [hereinafter Roth, Searching for State].  
 36 Roth, Do Prisoners, supra note 23, at 354.  
 37 Fiscal Year 1987 Continuing Resolution for Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 99-
500, 100 STAT. 1783 (1987) (General Provisions, Department of Justice, Section 209: 
“None of the funds appropriated by this title shall be available to pay for an abortion, 
except where the life of the mother would be endangered . . . or in the case of rape.”). 
 38 28 C.F.R. § 551.23 (1999).  In this Note, an “elective” abortion is one that 
the inmate chooses because she wishes to terminate her pregnancy.  A “medically 
necessary” abortion is one that is necessary because the inmate’s life is in danger. 
 39 Roth, Do Prisoners, supra note 23, at 361.  
 40 Id. at 364 (listing California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Vermont and Washington as the states with unrestricted access).  
 41 Id. at 366 (stating that the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee and West Virginia fund only medically 
necessary abortions).  Roth notes that this language of “medically necessary” and 
“elective” abortions is similar to that of “therapeutic” and “non-therapeutic” abortions, 
descriptions used in the era of illegal abortions when doctors and hospitals had to 
determine whether they were breaking the law by providing abortions.  Id. at 362.  
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access to abortion on the same basis as other “elective” medical 
care.  In these cases, the inmate must put in a request to prison 
officials, wait for permission subject to the whim of the 
administration, and then pay for all transportation and 
security.42  In many prisons, the inmate is required to get a 
court order for an abortion, even if she agrees to pay for all of 
the expenses.43  In Nevada, the prisoner is required to see a 
psychologist before she gains permission for an abortion.44 In 
Nebraska and Illinois, the inmate must be eligible for release 
on furlough, which places substantial obstacles for women in 
medium or maximum security situations.45  And lastly, 
fourteen states have no official written abortion policy.46  In 
states with no policy, women in different prisons in the same 
state may have differing access to abortion, and all inmates 
may have to wait for the prison to decide on its policy before 
they are or are not granted the procedure.  
In addition, state prison abortion policies are dependent 
on state abortion law. Twenty-five states have laws that 
require mandatory waiting periods to obtain an abortion47 and 
in these states inmates must make two trips out of the prison 
or stay overnight close to an abortion clinic.  This means 
increased costs and additional time delays in addition to 
prisons’ restrictive policies. 
Because a female inmate’s decision to have an abortion 
is subject to the whim of prison and jail administrators in their 
respective states, inmates’ constitutional rights to abortion are 
being drastically curtailed in many situations.  The rare 
instances in which a prison abortion restriction is challenged 
provide only a few examples of the myriad of cases that are not 
brought to litigators’ attention. A few of these stories follow.  
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court 
intervened in a case in which Missouri federal district and 
circuit courts ordered a state prison to allow an inmate to 
  
Therefore, if prison policies allow only medically necessary abortions, female inmates 
at these prisons are living within a pre-Roe world of abortion rights. 
 42 Id. at 366-67 (listing Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, South 
Carolina and Texas as the states with limited access).  
 43 See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2004); Monmouth 
County Corr. Inst’l Inmates, 834 F.2d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 44 Roth, Do Prisoners, supra note 23, at 367.  
 45 Id. at 367.  
 46 Id. at 368.   
 47 Center for Reproductive Rights, Mandatory Delays and Biased Information 
Requirements, available at http://www.crpl.org/st_law_delay.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2006). 
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obtain an abortion despite fierce resistance from the prison.48 
The inmate was pregnant when she was sent to prison for a 
parole violation, and tried for seven weeks to obtain an 
abortion.49 She had offered to pay for the procedure herself, but 
needed the prison to arrange for transportation to an abortion 
clinic.50  The prison refused to do so because of a Department of 
Corrections policy that does not allow for transportation of 
inmates for abortions that are not “medically necessary.”51 
After her mother frantically contacted the American Civil 
Liberties Union and they filed a law suit,52 the district court 
ordered the state to provide transportation for the abortion.53 
The district court found that the inmate would suffer 
irreparable injury if she was denied the procedure, and this 
would impinge on her constitutional rights.54 The prison first 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which refused to stay the 
district court’s order, and then to the United States Supreme 
Court.55 Justice Thomas, who has administrative jurisdiction 
over the Eighth Circuit, granted the state an emergency stay, 
and this blocked the abortion procedure.56 Three days later, 
however, the full Supreme Court vacated Thomas’s stay and 
allowed the procedure to go forward.57 
Similarly, the ACLU in Arizona sued the sheriff of 
Maricopa County, Arizona, for an unwritten policy requiring a 
court order to allow transport of an inmate to obtain an 
abortion.58 The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment, finding the policy unconstitutional.59 The 
  
 48 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup:  Prison Abortion Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, October 18, 2005, at 18.  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
 52 Erin Suess, ACLU Attorney Takes On State Over Female Inmate’s Right to 
Have Abortion, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Oct. 23, 2005. 
 53 Roe v. Crawford, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 2005).  
 54 Id. at 1044-45.  The district court quoted Roe v. Wade as describing the 
detriment a state would impose upon a woman by denying her this choice; found that 
the prison had no legitimate penological interest in denying inmates abortions; and 
stated that the prison’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs 
violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 1043-44.  
 55 Greenhouse, supra note 48, at 18.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. See Crawford v. Roe, 126 S. Ct. 477 (2005).  
 58 Doe v. Arpaio, No. CV 2004-009286, 2005 WL 2173988, at *1 (Ariz. Super. 
Aug. 25,  2005); see also Christina Leonard, Inmates’ Advocates Challenge Arpaio’s 
Abortion Roadblocks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 2004, at 1A.  
 59 Arpaio, 2005 WL 2173988 at *1.  
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sheriff wanted the state appellate courts to reconsider the case, 
stating “I don’t run a taxicab service for people in jail.”60 Before 
the court’s decision, the sheriff expressed his personal 
opposition to abortion on national television, saying that he 
would not transport female inmates to an abortion clinic, and 
that no prisoner would get an abortion unless a court ordered 
him to transport them.61  The sheriff admitted that it was fine 
if the inmate had to wait a long time for a court order, for “the 
gal may have the baby by the time it gets through the court 
system. . . . But we’ll take care of them [once they’re pregnant] 
in jail, like all medical conditions.”62  
In 2002 a judge in Ohio declared in open court that she 
was sending a young woman to jail on a forgery charge simply 
because the woman stated her intention to have an abortion if 
she was released on parole.63  While in jail the woman begged 
and pleaded with jail officials to allow her to get an abortion, 
but the inmate was released too late to get an abortion and 
gave birth.64 The county later settled with the woman for a 
small amount of money damages, and suspended the judge 
from the bench for six months.65 
Lastly, in the Spring of 2002, a 17-year old woman from 
Texas was sentenced to sixty days in boot camp.66  When she 
found out she was pregnant, she was ordered to serve her time 
in a privately run residential treatment center.67  After 
consulting with her mother, the young woman decided to have 
an abortion.68  When she was told by the center that she needed 
a court order for an abortion, a lawyer argued her case before a 
state court judge.69  The judge refused her request, saying an 
abortion was not in the young woman’s best interest.70  The 
  
 60 Michael Kiefer, Rule on Inmate Abortion Sought, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 
1995, at 9B.  
 61 The O’Reilly Factor:  Back of the Book (FOX television broadcast Oct. 28, 
2004). 
 62 Leonard, supra note 58.  
 63 John F. Hagan, Jail OKs Altered Abortion Policy; Settlement Includes 
Payment to Woman Jailed by Former Judge, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), June 4, 
2002, at B1; Press Release, ACLU, Settlement of ACLU of  Ohio “Pregnant Prisoner” 
Case Brings New Protections for Women in Jail (June 4, 2002), available at 
www.aclu.org/prison/women/14683prs20020604.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).  
 64 Hagan, supra note 63, at B1; Press Release, ACLU, supra note 63.  
 65 Hagan, supra note 63, at B1.  
 66 Roth, Searching for State, supra note 35, at 411.   
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. at 411-412. 
 70 Id. at 412.  
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mother contacted the National ACLU, and an ACLU attorney 
argued the case before a federal district court in Houston.71  
The federal judge gave a permanent injunction requiring the 
center to inform all their inmates of their reproductive rights.72  
Restrictive abortion policies have a profound effect on 
female inmates forced to give birth inside prison.  As detailed 
in the Roe v. Wade decision, the physical and mental harm that 
the state may impose by denying a woman the right to abortion 
may be extremely taxing: 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice is altogether apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be 
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the 
women a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be 
imminent. . . .  There is also the distress, for all concerned, 
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of 
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and 
otherwise, to care for it.73 
These issues are only exacerbated when a women is 
pregnant and gives birth in prison.  Most women enter prison 
with significant health issues because they are indigent or low-
income and have limited or no access to health care,74 and this 
may complicate their pregnancies greatly.  Medical services 
specific to women, such as gynecology and obstetrics, are often 
not available in prison or are of poor quality.75  Pregnant 
women are routinely transported to and from their pre-natal 
appointments in shackles.76  In addition, women in all stages of 
  
 71 Id.  
 72 Roth, Searching for State, supra note 35, at n.1 
 73 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).  
 74 Barry, supra note 22, at 40; see also Cynthia Chandler, Death and Dying in 
America: The Prison Industrial Complex’s Impact on Women’s Health, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L. J. 40, 42 (2003) (“Typically impoverished, these women have extremely 
limited access to preventative health care in the United States.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that women entering prison have a high incidence of serious health 
concerns, including . . . HIV, Hepatitis C, and reproductive diseases.”).  
 75 WILLIAM C. COLLINS WITH ANDREW W. COLLINS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN JAIL: LEGAL ISSUES 4 (1996), available at 
http://nicic.org/Library/013770.  See Mary Catherine McGurrin, Pregnant Inmates’ 
Right to Health Care, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 163, 164-70 
(1993) (discussing the inadequate prenatal care provided by women’s prisons); Barry, 
supra note 22, at 40 (discussing health care inadequacies in California state women’s 
prisons).  
 76 Barry, supra note 22, at 41; Rachel Roth, Justice Denied: Violations of 
Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States Prison System, at 
http://www.prochoiceforum.org/uk/psy_ocr10.asp; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 32 
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labor, including delivery, are shackled by their ankles to their 
hospital beds.77  Babies born to inmates are routinely separated 
from their mothers within twelve to forty-eight hours after 
birth,78 which may be traumatic for the mother and the infant.   
When a child is born to an incarcerated mother, the 
state immediately gives them to a relative or parental 
guardian, or places them in foster care.79  If the infant is given 
to the inmate’s family, she may rarely see her child, because 
prisoners are increasingly isolated from population centers, 
their families, and their communities.80  If the child is turned 
over to the foster care system, an incarcerated mother may 
soon permanently lose all parental rights to the child: the 1997 
Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”) requires that 
proceedings to terminate parental rights be initiated when the 
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two 
months.81  The termination of parental rights is almost always 
permanent and irrevocable, meaning the mother has no 
parental, education or visitation rights to her child once 
terminated.82  
In sum, although incarceration necessarily involves 
punishment, arbitrary prison abortion policies have serious 
  
(describing the shackling of pregnant inmates in Ohio, Massachusetts, Kentucky and 
Michigan); Nina Siegal, Inmates Again Shackled During Birth, Critics Say, N. Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1999.  
 77 Barry, supra note 22, at 41; Kenda Weatherhead, Cruel But Not Unusual 
Punishment: The Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Treatment to Female Prisoners 
in the United States, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 429, 450 (2003). 
 78 Barry, supra note 22, at 41.  
 79 Ronnie Halperin & Jennifer L. Harris, Parental Rights of Incarcerated 
Mothers with Children in Foster Care: A Policy Vacuum, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 339, 340 
(2004).  
 80 See Chandler, supra note 74, at 44; Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The 
Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of “Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 147, 152-58 (2004) (discussing the punitiveness of incarceration location 
and the expansion of the female penal system).  
 81 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115  
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(e) (1997)); see also Antoinette Greenaway, 
When Neutral Policies Aren’t So Neutral: Increasing Incarceration Rates and the Effect 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on the Parental Rights of African-
American Women, 17 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 247, 249 (2004) (arguing inmates are doubly 
punished by ASFA because they face a disproportionate threat to their parental rights); 
Martha L. Raimon, Barriers to Achieving Justice for Incarcerated Parents, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 421, 424 (2001) (“The enactment of [ASFA] exposes incarcerated parents to a 
very high risk of permanently losing their parental rights.”).   
 82 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION 
CASES§ 13.01, 2d. 3d. (1993). See id. at § 13.03 (where court found that a “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard was necessary because loss of parental rights is 
permanent, and an “irretrievable destruction of [] family life.”) (citing Santosky v.  
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).   
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consequences for female inmates that go beyond retribution for 
their crimes. Inmates and their advocates rely on courts to 
ensure that punishment does not become “cruel and unusual,”83 
but with federal courts’ increasing deference to prison 
administrators’ judgment, prisoner rights are drastically 
limited.  Because the consequences for women seeking abortion 
are so severe, the Supreme Court’s “hands off” policy as 
reflected in Turner v. Safley and its progeny is inappropriate in 
this context.  
III. TURNER AND ITS PROGENY: THE SUPREME COURT’S TEST 
FOR PRISON RESTRICTIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A.  Any “Legitimate Penological Interest”: Turner and the 
Return to the Hands-Off Doctrine  
Historically, the Supreme Court utilized a position of 
almost complete deference to prison officials, considering 
prisoners to be “slave[s] of the State,” having “not only forfeited 
[their] liberty, but all  [their] personal rights . . . .”84  The 
Court’s “hands off” doctrine continued until the 1960’s, when 
the Court ultimately found that prison inmates were deserving 
of limited constitutional rights.85  
In Procunier v. Martinez, while reviewing a prison 
policy that infringed on inmates’ freedom of speech, the Court 
first recognized the confusion among lower courts as to the 
appropriate standard of review in prisoner rights cases.86  In 
this case, the Court acknowledged that courts were ill-equipped 
to deal with the administration of prisons, but recognized that 
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their 
duty to protect constitutional rights.”87 The Court ultimately 
did not create a new standard for prisoner rights cases in 
  
 83 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 84 See Lorijean Golichowski Dei, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners’ 
Rights:  A “Turner” For the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 399 (1988) (alteration to 
original) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 
(1977) (Marshall, J. dissenting)). See also Herman, supra note 19, at 1242-45. 
 85 See Golichowski Dei, supra note 84, at 399.  
 86 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974) (“[T]he tension between the 
traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to 
protect constitutional rights has led the federal courts to adopt a variety of widely 
inconsistent approaches to the problem.”).  
 87 Id. at 405.  
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Martinez, basing their decision on the first amendment rights 
of the persons outside the prison with whom the inmates were 
corresponding.88 
The first modern case to concretize a standard to 
determine the constitutionality of prison regulations that 
restrict constitutional rights was the 1987 case Turner v. 
Safley.89  The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist at 
its helm, defined its task as creating a standard of review that 
would balance the prison’s interest in maintaining safety and 
security, with the protection of inmates’ constitutional rights.90 
The result, however, was a return to the earlier hands-off 
doctrine that paid vast deference to prison officials in 
determining prison policy, and diminished the rights of 
inmates because of their incarceration. 
In Turner, Missouri inmates brought a class action suit 
challenging two prison regulations:  one restricting inmate-to-
inmate correspondence, the other prohibiting marriages 
between inmates.91  Recognizing that “[p]rison walls do not 
form a barrier separating inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution,”92 the Court nevertheless created a standard that 
was extremely deferential to prison administrators. The Turner 
Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”93  In 
focusing on the prison’s interests, the Court based its test on 
the idea that it was necessary to defer to prison administrators’ 
judgments in making prison policy, and wrong to unnecessarily 
involve the courts in prison affairs.94  The Court explained that 
applying a strict scrutiny standard would require prison 
officials to predict which remedy was least restrictive, thereby 
hindering their ability to keep the prison secure.95 
The Court considered four factors relevant in 
determining whether a prison regulation was reasonable.  
First, there must be a “valid, rational connection between the 
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest.”96  
  
 88 Id. at 409, 413. 
 89 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 90 Id. at 85.  
 91 Id. at 81-82.  
 92 Id. at 84.  
 93 Id. at 89.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
 96 Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
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The regulation may not be upheld if the connection between it 
and the government interest is so remote that the policy is 
“arbitrary or irrational.”97  Second, a regulation is more likely 
to be deemed reasonable and thus given deference if there were 
alternative means open to inmates for exercising the 
constitutional right.98  Third, the Court should consider the 
impact that accommodating this right would have on guards, 
prison resources, and other inmates.99  And fourth, if there is 
an alternative to the policy, it must accommodate a prisoner’s 
rights at a minimum cost to the prison’s penological 
interests.100  
In evaluating the inmates’ challenge to the prison 
regulations, the Turner Court upheld the letter-writing 
restriction, but struck down the inmate marriage restriction.101 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, found that the 
prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence was 
reasonably related to the prison’s concerns that mail could be 
used to communicate escape plans, exacerbated the growing 
problem of prison gangs, and compromised the prison’s ability 
to provide protective custody to certain inmates.102  In addition, 
the Court found that the restriction did not deprive inmates of 
all means of communicating with other inmates, and there 
were no ready alternatives to the policy available to the 
prison.103 
In striking the prison’s marriage regulation, the Court 
noted that the decision to marry was a fundamental right 
under prior Supreme Court law.104  “It is settled that a prison 
inmate ‘retains those [constitutional] rights that are not 
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system.’”105  The 
majority noted that there were many valid reasons for allowing 
prisoners to marry: marriages are a sign of commitment and 
emotional support; marriages are a symbol of religious faith; 
prisoners may be released and want to live together as 
  
 97 Id. at 89-90. 
 98 Id. at 90. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id  at 90-91 (emphasis added).  
 101 Turner, 482 U.S. at 99-100.  
 102 Id. at 91.  
 103 Id. at 92-93. 
 104 Id. at 95 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 105 Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).  
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husband and wife; and many governmental benefits are 
conditioned on marital status.106 Although the Missouri prison 
identified several security concerns in supporting the marriage 
prohibition,107 the Court found the policy an “exaggerated 
response to [the prison’s] security objectives,” and that the rule 
swept much more broadly than necessary.108  Lastly, the Court 
noted that there were “obvious, easy alternatives to 
the . . . regulation that accommodate the right to marry while 
imposing a [minimal] burden on . . . security.”109 
Justice Stevens, dissenting with three other justices, 
objected to the heightened deference afforded to prison 
authorities by the Turner majority’s holding.  The dissenting 
Justices found the Turner standard needlessly broad, and 
overly restrictive of prisoner’s constitutional rights: 
[I]f the standard can be satisfied by nothing more than a ‘logical 
connection’ between the regulation and any legitimate penological 
concern perceived by a cautious warden . . . it is virtually 
meaningless. [It] would seem to permit disregard for inmates’ 
constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden 
produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is 
able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the 
challenged regulation. Indeed, there is a logical connection between 
prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on prisoners; and security 
is logically furthered by a total ban on inmate 
communication . . . with outsiders.110  
In addition, the Dissent found the Court’s acceptance of 
the mail restrictions and rejection of the marriage restriction 
“striking and puzzling.”111 The majority upheld the ban on 
inmate correspondence based on the prison’s ambiguous 
speculations about possible gang violence, escapes, and the fact 
that it would be impossible to read every piece of inmate 
correspondence to determine possible danger.112  In contrast, 
  
 106 Id. at 95-96. 
 107 The Missouri officials argued that the marriage restriction was necessary 
because “love triangles” may lead to violence, and because female prisoners were overly 
dependant on male figures and needed to concentrate on self-reliance.  Turner, 482 
U.S. at 97.  
 108 Id. at 97-98.  
 109 Id. at 98.  
 110 Id. at 100-01 (internal citation omitted, emphasis in original).  
 111 Id. at 112-13.  
 112 Id. at 105-06.  The prison argued that reading every inmate letter would be 
virtually impossible, despite the fact that at other Missouri prisons, where inmates 
were not prohibited from corresponding, the prisons managed to read each inmate’s 
letters.  Id. at 104.  
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the majority rejected the prison’s explanation that marriage 
would cause dangerous “love triangles” and possible escape 
communications between married inmates.113  
Following its decision in Turner, the Supreme Court 
immediately applied this more deferential review in O’Lone v. 
Shabazz114 during the same term.  In Shabazz, prisoners who 
were members of the Islamic faith challenged policies that 
restricted them from attending a weekly religious service in the 
prison.115  For many years, Muslim prisoners were allowed to 
work inside, rather than outside, the prison building on Friday 
afternoons so that they could attend a prayer service that is a 
central tenet of the Islamic faith.  The prison changed this 
policy in 1983, and the prisoners who were denied access to the 
prayer service sued.116   
Applying the Turner four-factor test, the Supreme Court 
asserted that the prison regulations were valid because they 
were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.117  
The Court defined the prison’s legitimate penological interests 
as security, rehabilitation, and deterrence of crime.118  The 
Court stated that requiring the prisoners to work outside the 
prison on Fridays was reasonably related to the prison’s 
interest in security and order.119  In addition, although the 
Court conceded that there were no alternative means of 
attending the Friday prayer service, the prisoners were given 
other opportunities to express their freedom of religion by 
participating in other Muslim religious rituals.120  
In a dissent joined by four other Justices, Justice 
Brennan again criticized the majority for a too obsequious 
Turner analysis.121  Brennan noted that the Turner standard 
was categorically deferential, and did not discriminate among 
degrees of rights deprivation.122  Therefore, the dissent 
concluded, under Turner, “restricting the use of the prison 
library to certain hours warrants the same level of scrutiny as 
  
 113 Turner, 482 U.S. at 113.  
 114 482 U.S. 342 (1987).  
 115 Id. at 342.  
 116 Id. at 345-46.  
 117 Id. at 350.  
 118 Id. at 348.   
 119 Id. at 350-51.  
 120 O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1987).  
 121 Id. at 354.  
 122 Id. at 356.  
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preventing inmates from reading at all.”123  In addition, the 
dissent criticized the Court’s automatic denial of the prisoner’s 
four proposed viable alternatives to the restrictions.124  
However, as the dissent recognized, the Turner test does not 
require the prison to “shoot down every conceivable alternative 
method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional 
complaint.”125 Finally, the dissent argued that a proper 
standard would require the prison to demonstrate that a 
regulation is necessary to further an important governmental 
interest, and the restrictions are no greater than necessary to 
achieve those interests.126 
The Supreme Court later revisited the Turner 
deferential standard in 2003, in Overton v. Bazzetta.127  In 
Bazetta, prison officials significantly restricted visitation for 
inmates: an inmate could only receive visits from individuals 
that were on an approved visitation list, except for attorneys or 
members of the clergy; children under the age of 18 were not 
allowed unless they were the children, stepchildren, 
grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate; if the parental rights 
of the inmate were terminated, the child could not be a visitor; 
a former prisoner could not visit unless they were a family 
member and only with warden approval; and prisoners who 
committed multiple substance abuse violations could not have 
any visitors for two years, except for attorneys and members of 
the clergy.128  
The District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan 
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Turner, and 
found the restrictions unconstitutional.129 However, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ holdings, finding 
that the regulations were rationally related to legitimate 
penological interests.130  Noting that many liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by free persons must be surrendered in 
prison, the Court found that “[a]n inmate does not retain rights 
inconsistent with proper incarceration.”131 The Supreme Court 
  
 123 Id.   
 124 Id. at 367.  
 125 Id. at 363 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)). 
 126 Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 354.  
 127 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 
 128 Id. at 129-30.   
 129 Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311, 316-17, 322 (6th Cir. 2002); Bazzetta 
v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 847-49, 856-57 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  
 130 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 131-32.  
 131 Id. at 131.  
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held that the restrictions on children’s visitation were 
rationally related to internal security and keeping children 
from harm.132  Next the Court found that communicating via 
letter or telephone were acceptable substitutions to visitation, 
because under Turner, the alternatives “need not be 
ideal . . . they need only be available.”133  In addition, the Court 
found the total visitation ban for drug abusers severe, but 
necessary to serve the valid prison goal of deterring drug use.134  
Justice Stevens, along with three other Justices, wrote a 
short concurrence emphasizing that nothing in the Court’s 
decision marked a return to the view that prisoners may only 
challenge restrictions under the Eighth Amendment 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.135 Justice 
Thomas, however, joined by Scalia, wrote a separate 
concurrence asserting the opposite: that the courts should not 
review a prisoner rights case if there is no Eighth Amendment 
violation.136  After all, Thomas noted, nineteenth century 
prisons did not allow any visits for prisoners, therefore if this 
prison wanted to return to that incarceration method, it should 
be free to.137 
Critics argued that in finding the policy constitutional, 
the Supreme Court virtually ignored findings that were 
essential to the lower courts’ decisions.138  For example, the 
trial court found that although the Department of Corrections 
asserted that the restrictions were needed to control drug 
abuse, the Department conceded that there was no data 
showing that the amount of substance abuse declined because 
of the visitation restrictions.139  In addition, the director of the 
prison admitted that his personal and philosophical belief was 
that prison was not a good place for children to visit; therefore 
the lower court found the restrictions were motivated by the 
directors’ personal beliefs, and not legitimate prison 
  
 132 Id. at 133.  
 133 Id. at 135.  
 134 Id. at 134.  
 135 Id. at 138.  
 136 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 139.  
 137 Id. at 143-45.  
 138  Krysten Sinema, Note, Overton v. Bazzetta:  How the Supreme Court Used 
Turner to Sound the Death Knell for Prisoner Rehabilitation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 481-
83 (2004).   
 139 Id. at 481, citing Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 843 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001). 
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interests.140  The lower courts also noted that if a prisoner was 
violent or threatening, they were not subject to a ban on 
visitation, and therefore the punishment for drug abusers was 
excessively capricious.141  And finally, the lower court found 
that letters and phone calls to family members were not an 
equal alternative form of First Amendment expression for the 
inmate.  
B.  A Prisoners’ Rights Revolution: The Johnson Critique of 
Turner 
The most recent case testing the applicability of the 
Turner standard, Johnson v. California,142 was decided by the 
Supreme Court in February of 2005.  The Johnson case is 
unique in that the Court did not find that a prison regulation 
failed the Turner test, but that the Turner standard should not 
be used at all to evaluate a restrictive policy.  The Johnson 
Court’s decision not to apply Turner, as well as their 
compelling critique of the deferential standard, created a shift 
that could have a significant effect on prisoner rights litigation 
in the future.143  
Johnson, an African-American inmate, sued the 
California Department of Corrections (CDC) challenging the 
prison’s unwritten policy of segregating inmates by race in the 
first sixty days of their incarceration.144  According to the CDC, 
when an inmate arrives at or transfers to a California prison, 
he is initially housed in a reception center for sixty days to 
establish his security status.145  To determine the inmate’s 
placement, the prison looks at many factors, including the 
inmate’s criminal and incarceration history, and gang 
affiliation.146  Although race is only one of the factors 
considered, the CDC admits it is the dominant factor: according 
to the prison, the chance of an inmate being assigned to a cell 
with an inmate of a different race is almost “zero percent.”147  
Johnson, serving a felony conviction in state prison, had been 
  
 140 Bazzetta, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 824, 828.  
 141 Id. at 843-44.  
 142 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).  
 143 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Civil Rights Victory For Prisoners, 41-MAY 
JTLA TRIAL 76, 77 (2005).  
 144 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1144-45.  
 145 Id. at 1144.  
 146 Id.; see also Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 147 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1144. 
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transferred to several different facilities, and at each he was 
celled with another African-American inmate for the first sixty 
days.148  As a pro se plaintiff, Johnson filed a complaint alleging 
that the CDC’s policy subjected him to racial discrimination in 
violation of his Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.149  The Department of Corrections argued that the 
policy was necessary to reduce the threat of racial violence, and 
therefore the regulation passed the Turner test.150 
The Ninth Circuit found that the Turner standard 
applied and upheld California’s policy, concluding that it was 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.151  After 
the full Ninth Circuit denied Johnson’s petition for an en banc 
rehearing,152 however, four Justices wrote a rare and scathing 
dissent to the denial, arguing that the Turner test should not 
control in reviewing racial segregation policies.153  First, the 
dissent asserted that racial discrimination “cannot plausibly be 
said to be []consistent with the legitimate penological objectives 
of the corrections system.”154  The dissent also noted the 
potential for abuse in allowing prisons deference in matters of 
racial discrimination.155  They lastly stated that the right to be 
free from state segregation is qualitatively different from other 
rights to which Turner had been applied, and therefore the 
policy should be subject to strict scrutiny.156  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari,157 and the issue before the Court was 
whether the Court should use the strict scrutiny standard 
usually applied to intentional race discrimination cases, or the 
more deferential Turner standard of review.158 
In a remarkable decision that could alter the 
applicability of the Turner standard to all prisoner rights cases, 
the Supreme Court found that the lower court should have 
evaluated the policy under strict scrutiny, instead of under 
  
 148 Id. at 1145.  
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 1144.  
 151 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798-99, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 152 Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  
 153 See generally id.  
 154 Id. at 1122.  
 155 Id. at 1119-20.  
 156 Id. at 1122.  
 157 Johnson v. California, 124 S. Ct. 1505 (2004). 
 158 Brief for Petitioner at i, Johnson v. California, 124 S. Ct. 1505 (2004) (No. 
03-636). 
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Turner.159  Though the Court noted that there were numerous 
“violent and murderous” incidents of racial violence in 
California prisons, and the warden said that if race was not 
used, there would surely be racial conflict in the prison,160 the 
Court explicitly rejected the idea that courts owed the prison 
the Turner measure of deference in the case.161  
Citing Overton v. Bazzetta, the Court emphasized that 
“[they] have applied Turner’s reasonable relationship test only 
to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’”162  
“The right not to be discriminated against based on one’s race 
is not susceptible to the logic of Turner,” and “[i]t is not a right 
that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper 
prison administration.”163  “On the contrary,” the Court noted, 
“compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent 
with proper prison administration.”164  
The Court reiterated that strict scrutiny was necessary 
in any case that involves racial classifications, in order to 
ensure that these classifications are not motivated by 
“illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or race politics,” or an 
“invidious purpose.”165  The Court then stated that the need for 
strict scrutiny was no less important in prison.166  The Court 
secondarily noted that judicial review of prison policies is an 
important check on executive power.  “In the prison context, 
when the government’s power is at its apex, we think that 
searching judicial review of racial classifications is necessary to 
guard against invidious discrimination.”167  
The majority even went so far as to criticize the flaws in 
the original Turner holding, stating that the Turner standard 
was “too lenient” to ferret out invidious uses of race, because 
the policy only requires a reasonable link to “legitimate 
penological interests.”168 Applying Turner would allow prison 
officials the unfettered ability to use race-based policies even 
  
 159 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005). 
 160 Id. at 1145.  
 161 Id. at 1149.  
 162 Id. (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (emphasis in 
original)); see also id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“According to the majority, the 
question is thus whether a right ‘need necessarily be compromised for the sake of 
proper prison administration.’”).  
 163 Id. at 1149.  
 164 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1149. 
 165 Id. at 1146.  
 166 Id. at 1147.  
 167 Id. at 1150.  
 168 Id. at 1151.  
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when it does not advance any goal, or where there are race-
neutral means of accomplishing the same goal.169  In fact, the 
Court noted, it would allow officials to segregate prison 
visiting-rooms, dining halls, yards or housing areas if they felt 
it caused unrest.170 Citing Justice Ferguson’s dissent in the 
denial of a Ninth Circuit en banc rehearing, the Supreme Court 
also stated that the burden on the prisoner was too high: “The 
prisoner would have the burden of proving that there would not 
be a riot.”171 
Justice Thomas’s bitter dissent, joined by Justice 
Scalia,172 made clear that the majority’s analysis of Turner was 
a significant departure from the interpretation previously 
applied by the Supreme Court.  “The majority’s test eviscerates 
Turner,” Thomas stated.173 Justice Thomas described the 
majority’s holding as asking whether a right “need necessarily 
be compromised for the sake of proper prison 
administration.”174  In asking this, the majority placed the 
burden on prison administrators to prove that a restrictive 
policy was necessary in order to properly operate the prison, 
instead of forcing the inmate to prove the policy could not 
possibly be rationally explained.  This “threshold standard-of-
review inquiry,”175 as Thomas called it, begins with the 
assumption that the inmate has a constitutional right to lose, 
and finds that if a policy is not necessary, the right must be 
given to the inmate.176  In addition, this interpretation means 
that every administrative decision would be subject to a court’s 
judgment that it has a less restrictive way of solving a 
penological issue.177 
The majority explicitly rejected Thomas’ assertion that 
Turner should apply “across-the-board to inmates’ 
  
 169 Id.  
 170 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1151.  
 171 Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis in original)).  
 172 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not take part in the Johnson decision.  See id. 
at 1144.  
 173 Id. at 1167.  
 174 Id. at 1149; see also id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 175 Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 176 This is in direct contrast to Justice Thomas’ interpretation of inmates’ 
rights.  “When a prisoner makes a constitutional claim, the initial question should be 
whether the prisoner possesses the right at issue at all, or whether instead the 
prisoner has been divested of the right as a condition of his conviction and 
confinement.” Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1160.  
 177 Id. at 1161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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constitutional challenges to prison policies.”178  Turner should 
apply uniformly, Thomas argued, because it is the correct 
balance between accommodating administrators’ needs and 
protecting prisoner’s rights.179  The Turner deferential standard 
is necessary, Justice Thomas warned, because it is the job of 
prison administrators, and not courts, to make difficult 
decisions concerning prison operations.180  Justice Thomas then 
found that the prison’s racial segregation policy would, in fact, 
pass the Turner deferential standard and strict scrutiny, and 
so the policy was constitutional.181 
IV.  MONMOUTH AND VICTORIA W.: INMATE ABORTION 
RIGHTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS  
Because the Supreme Court has never heard a case that 
evaluates the constitutionality of prison abortion policies, there 
is currently a circuit split as to the application of Turner to 
restrictions on abortion rights.  In two very similar cases, 
Monmouth and Victoria W., the Third and Fifth Circuits, 
respectively, applied the Turner standard, yet generated vastly 
different decisions.  In Monmouth, the Third Circuit found the 
restriction unreasonable under Turner, while the Fifth Circuit 
in Victoria W. found the restriction reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest. These two anomalous cases 
clearly illustrate the inconsistent ways that Turner can be 
applied, and also describe the barriers to abortion access that 
women in prison typically face from prison administrators. 
A.  Upholding the Abortion Rights of Inmates: Monmouth v. 
Lanzaro 
In Monmouth, inmates originally filed a class action 
lawsuit against a New Jersey prison challenging overcrowding 
and inadequacy of prison health services.182  In March of 1985, 
the prison agreed to resolve the case by consent decree, but the 
  
 178 Id. at 1160 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 179 Id. at 1161 (Thomas, J., dissenting). (“If Turner is our accommodation of 
the Constitution’s demands to those of a prison administration . . . we should apply it 
uniformly to prisoners’ challenges to their conditions of confinement.”).  
 180 Id. at 1168-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 181 Id. at 1163, 1171 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 182 Monmouth County Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 328 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
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decree did not mention access to abortion.183  More than a year 
later, on or about March 3, 1986, inmate Jane Doe informed 
the medical staff at the prison that she wanted an abortion, but 
she was told that pursuant to prison policy, the prison would 
not allow her to have an abortion without a court order.184  No 
other elective medical procedures, however, were subject to a 
court-order policy.185  The original class of inmates responded 
by applying for injunctive relief, requesting an abortion for Doe 
and access to abortion services for all Monmouth inmates.  
Pending the resolution of the case, Doe was released to get an 
abortion, but the inmates continued the suit on behalf of all 
inmates seeking abortions.186  
The inmates asserted that the policy was an 
unconstitutional infringement on their right to privacy under 
Roe v. Wade.187  Following oral arguments for the Monmouth 
case in the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Turner v. 
Safley, and the Circuit Court then applied Turner to 
Monmouth.188 
Although the Turner standard advocates deference to 
prison administrators, the Monmouth court recognized that the 
policy violated the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, 
and so found the regulations did not pass the Turner 
standard.189  Pursuant to the Turner test, the Monmouth court 
paid particular attention to the prison’s justification for the 
policy, saying that the government interests asserted by the 
prison were “administrative and financial burdens.”190 The 
court then held that the policy could not be justified on those 
interests: “Security is no less protected, crime is no less 
deterred, retribution is not undermined, and rehabilitation is 
not hindered, by a prisoner’s right to an abortion.”191  The 
prison policy, therefore, was an “exaggerated response” to the 
prison’s concerns.192 The court emphasized that to delay an 
  
 183 Id. 
 184 Id.  
 185 Id. at 335.  
 186 Id. at 328-29. 
 187 Id. at 329.  In 1987, when Monmouth was decided, the binding precedent 
was Roe v. Wade, holding that a state could not prohibit abortion in the first trimester 
of a woman’s pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. 
 188 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 331-32.  
 189 Id. at 338.  
 190 Id. at 336.  
 191 Id. at 338, (quoting Anne T. Vitale, Inmate Abortions—The Right to 
Government Funding Behind Prison Gates, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 550, 556 (1980)).  
 192 Id. at 344.  
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abortion is to deny women a choice, citing the Supreme Court’s 
decisions that invalidate government-imposed delays.193  The 
court also noted that the policy failed to consider the stage of 
the pregnancy at the time of the inmate’s request, and deprived 
maximum security inmates of any opportunity to choose 
abortion,194 which violated abortion rights precedent. 
B.  Deference to Prison Administrators: Victoria W. v. 
Larpenter 
Victoria W. v. Larpenter195 was the most recent challenge 
to a prison abortion policy, and was decided in April of 2004.  
Victoria, a female inmate from a Louisiana parish jail, brought 
a civil rights action challenging the jail’s policy of requiring 
inmates to obtain a court order to receive an abortion at any 
stage of pregnancy.196  Victoria argued the court order policy 
violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion, and 
her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.197  The Fifth Circuit held that the jail’s court order 
policy was not unconstitutional because it was “reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests” under the Turner v. 
Safley standard.198 The court also found that abortion as an 
elective procedure was not a serious medical need, and 
therefore denial of an abortion did not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.199  
Victoria entered jail on July 28, 1999.200  Victoria 
learned she was pregnant through a routine medical 
examination, she informed the medical administrator that she 
wanted an abortion, and they directed her to meet with the 
head nurse.201  Despite her request, Victoria was not permitted 
  
 193 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 339 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstets., 476 U.S. 747 
(1986)).  
 194 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 337, 340.  
 195 369 F.3d 475, 475 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 196 Id. at 478.  
 197 Id. at 481.  
 198 Id. at 485.  
 199 Id. at 486, 487, n.52.  Note that this appellate court decision was made by 
three male Circuit Court judges: the Honorable Patrick Higginbotham, the Honorable 
Carl E. Stewart, and the Honorable Edward C. Prado. Id. at 477.  Defining abortion as 
elective and not medically necessary may be a particularly gendered decision. 
 200 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 478.  
 201 Id.  
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to see the head nurse.202  On July 31 she complained of back 
pain, and jail officials transported her to a local hospital where 
a blood test confirmed her pregnancy.203  She again informed 
jail personnel that she wanted an abortion, and was told to 
speak to the head nurse.204  On August 3, she was transported 
to the hospital for a gynecological exam, and then on August 6, 
she was transported to the hospital for an ultrasound.205  The 
jail’s medical administrator, Ed Byerly, was finally told of 
Victoria’s request for an abortion on August 9, and alerted the 
warden, Joe Null.206  It was not until August 12th that Byerly 
told Victoria that she needed a court order for an abortion,207 at 
which time she was almost four months pregnant.208  Victoria 
immediately phoned an attorney who had formerly represented 
her daughter and told him to obtain a court order.209  Over the 
next week, Victoria did not hear from her attorney.  Finally, on 
August 19, the sheriff’s attorney William Dodd, who had been 
alerted to the situation, wrote Victoria a letter, in which he 
said that Victoria’s attorney may not represent her because of 
moral reasons,210 but that this was not the jail or the county’s 
problem.211 On August 24th, almost four weeks after Victoria 
initially requested an abortion, Byerly again reiterated the 
jail’s court order policy to Victoria.212  
Victoria’s attorney finally filed a motion on her behalf 
on September 9th, but unbeknownst to Victoria, his motion 
contained a request not for transportation to obtain an abortion 
but rather for early release from the remainder of her sentence 
because of inadequate prenatal care in jail.213  Victoria was 
brought to the courthouse the day of the hearing, but was 
  
 202 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 
(2004) (No. 02-30598).  
 203 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 478. 
 204 Id.  
 205 Id.  
 206 Id.  
 207 Id. at 479. 
 208 Id. at 478. 
 209 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 479; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, Victoria W. 
(No. 02-30598). Victoria did not have representation before this request, but searched 
for and contacted an attorney specifically to obtain a court order for an abortion. Brief 
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, Victoria W. (No. 02-30598). 
 210 Id.  
 211 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 10, Victoria W. (No. 02-30598). 
 212 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 480. 
 213 Id.  
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detained in the holding area during her hearing.214 The judge 
held the motion in abeyance pending a medical evaluation.215  
Victoria was told that to gain early release she would need to 
hire an expert to research the prenatal care at the jail at a cost 
of $1500.  She told her attorney she could not afford this.216  
Victoria was released from jail on October 13th, too late to 
obtain a legal abortion in Louisiana.217 Because of this, Victoria 
carried the child to term, experiencing what her lawyers 
described as “significant physical pain and discomfort, as well 
as psychological distress.”218  Her pregnancy was repeatedly 
designated as “high risk” in her medical file, and after an 
emergency cesarean section,219 she gave birth and then 
immediately placed the newborn with adoptive parents.220 
In deciding the Victoria W. case, the Court of Appeals 
noted that under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, government 
regulation of abortion was not permissible if it imposed an 
undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose abortion.221  The 
court, however, held that the policy was constitutionally 
permissible under the Turner standard, finding the policy was 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.222  
The court found a valid, rational connection between the 
jail’s interests of inmate security and avoidance of liability and 
the policy requiring inmates to obtain a court order for an 
abortion.223  The court found the policy was not arbitrary 
because all “elective” medical care, including abortion, required 
a court order.224  The court noted that heart attacks and labor 
  
 214 Id.  
 215 Id.  
 216 Id.  
 217 Id.   
 218 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 15, Victoria W. (No. 02-30598). 
 219  Id. at 15-16. 
 220 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 480. 
 221 Id. at 483 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).  
 222 Id. at 485.  
 223 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 486.  
 224 Id.  The court notably ignored evidence stated in the petitioner’s brief that 
the prison proffered no proof to substantiate the claim that all elective care required a 
court order, and in fact administrators stated they “could not remember” the last time 
a court order was needed for medical care.  Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, 
Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-30598) (citing Bylerly 
Deposition: “[t]o say that a court order is necessary to receive medical care, I’ve never 
had anything like that happen.”).  In addition, the court did not mention that when 
Victoria was having minor back-pain, she did not need a court order and was 
transferred to the hospital immediately, and yet she was required to wait weeks for an 
abortion.  Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 478. 
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pains were serious medical needs, but it declined to recognize 
that abortion, which is time restricted and may lead to a 
myriad of health issues associated with pregnancy, was a 
serious medical need.225   The policy, the court noted, allowed 
the jail to track each time an inmate left the prison, which 
placed inmates in a less-secure environment, increased the 
chance of escape, increased jail liability and reduced jail 
resources.226  In addition, the court noted that the policy did not 
delay abortion because it could be implemented quickly.227  
As illustrated by these cases, Turner can be applied in 
very different ways to achieve opposite results: inmates in the 
Third Circuit are guaranteed a right to abortion under 
Monmouth, but those in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere in the 
country are subject to the whim of prison administrators’ policy 
decisions.  It is this manipulability that makes Turner a faulty 
standard for protecting the abortion rights of female prisoners. 
For this reason, courts should decline to apply Turner to 
evaluating prison abortion policies, using the Roe and Casey 
standards to protect abortion rights in Turner’s place.  
V.  A NEW APPROACH: ARGUING AGAINST APPLYING TURNER 
TO PRISON ABORTION POLICIES 
As evidenced by the Monmouth and Victoria W. 
decisions, courts’ evaluations of prison abortion policies under 
Turner can be arbitrary and irrational.  Under Turner, an 
inmate’s right to abortion will always depend on whether a 
court defers to the prison’s asserted penological interests.  For 
this reason, it is important for reproductive rights advocates to 
move outside of the Turner framework, arguing instead that 
the deferential standard should not apply to a court’s 
evaluation of prison abortion policies.  The Johnson v. 
California decision, in which the Supreme Court declined to 
apply Turner to a prison policy and presented significant 
  
 225 Id. at 486 n.52. 
 226 Id.  According to the brief for the plaintiff, the district court identified 
these as penological interests, despite the fact that none of these interests was 
advanced by the prison at trial.  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 35, Victoria W. (No. 02-
30598).  
 227 The court found that the policy could be implemented quickly, as evidenced 
by the fact that the judge reviewed Victoria’s request and scheduled a hearing the next 
day.  Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 486.  However, the sheriff’s attorney Dodd acknowledged 
in a deposition that it could take two weeks or longer to obtain a court hearing in the 
local courts, and even longer to obtain a court order.  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, 
n.5, Victoria W. (No. 02-30598).  
2006] PRISON ABORTION POLICIES 1321 
critiques of the Turner standard, is critical for this type of 
argument.228  
In this section, this Note argues that Turner should not 
apply to prison abortion policies for several reasons.  First, the 
right to an abortion is similar to the Eighth Amendment right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; Eighth 
Amendment claims have never been evaluated under the 
Turner test, and therefore abortion rights cases should also not 
be subject to Turner. Second, the same considerations that 
compelled the Supreme Court to not apply Turner to racial 
classifications in Johnson are also applicable to abortion rights 
cases.  The Court’s concerns about deferring to prison 
administrators in matters of racial classifications are equally, if 
not more, pertinent to the right to an abortion. 
A.  Abortion’s Similarities to the Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has applied Turner to regulations 
that impinge on free speech, free association, freedom of 
religion and due process.229  In contrast, inmate lawsuits under 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment are not subject to the Turner standard.230  Turner 
should not apply to abortion policies because the right to 
abortion can be distinguished from those rights that do fall 
under the Turner framework, and the interests at stake in 
abortion are similar to those reflected in the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
The Eighth Amendment has become more than a 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment: it also 
prohibits “unnecessary and wanton” infliction of pain that is 
without penological justification, and denial of adequate 
medical care.231  In fact, in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme 
Court found that a withholding of adequate medical care is 
  
 228 See infra, Part III.  
 229 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (freedom of association); 
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001) (freedom of association, speech); Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990) (due process of law); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401, 401-02, 404 (freedom of speech); O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-51 
(1987) (freedom of religion); Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 (freedom of speech, marriage).  
 230 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (no reference to Turner); 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (same); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) 
(same).  
 231 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294, 297-99 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)).  
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cruel and unusual because “in the worst cases . . . [it] may 
actually produce physical torture or a lingering death . . . [and 
in] less serious cases . . . may result in pain and suffering 
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”232  
The Estelle Court found that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
prison officials from “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s 
“serious medical needs.”  The Supreme Court has left it to 
lower courts to define what is a “serious medical need.” Circuit 
courts have found, for example, that a “serious medical need” 
includes a broken nose,233 severe muscle cramps,234 and a 
broken arm.235  The Supreme Court has, however, held that a 
prison may not expose an inmate to a substantial risk of 
serious damage to their future health by acting with deliberate 
indifference.236   
The type of pain that is prohibited by the Supreme 
Court under Estelle can be analogized to the denial of abortion. 
Abortion is clearly a “serious medical need” under the Eighth 
Amendment, and a prison should not be able to expose an 
inmate to the substantial risk of serious damage to future 
health by denying her the right to terminate their pregnancy.  
As asserted by Part II of this note, and as recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Roe and Casey, forcing a woman to give birth 
has profound, permanent, physical and emotional effects on the 
inmate mother and her child.237 As the Court reaffirmed in 
Casey: 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to 
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear . . . . Her 
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without 
more, upon its own vision of the women’s role.238 
Forcing a woman to give birth in prison against her will 
would have lasting physical and emotional effects on her and 
on the child she bears. Although First Amendment and Due 
Process restrictions have substantial negative consequences for 
prisoners’ lives, they do not compromise the present and future 
  
 232 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (internal citation omitted).  The court found “[t]he 
infliction of such unnecessary suffering [] inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency . . .”  Id.  
 233 Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm’r, 841 F.2d 751, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 234 East v. Lemons, 768 F.2d 1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 235 Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1978).  
 236 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).  
 237 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also discussion infra Part II.  
 238 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
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bodily integrity of the inmate as compared to the denial of 
medical care or abortion.  Abortion is different from other 
rights under Turner because, as stated in Casey, abortion is 
one of the most unique and definitional choices a woman makes 
over her body.239  For this reason, inmates may not be subject to 
forced childbirth in the same way that they may not be left 
without adequate medical care. 
For more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court 
has found that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction 
of cruel and unusual punishment in the form of “torture” or 
“unnecessary cruelty,” and this includes the cruelty of denying 
medical care to inmates.240 Our society, and our courts, would 
not accept the complete denial of medical care to inmates while 
they are incarcerated.241  Therefore, denying an inmate an 
abortion procedure and forcing her to give birth against her 
will is unacceptable, because it subjects her to a lifetime term 
of motherhood.  
B.  The New Johnson Decision as Applied to Prison Abortion 
Policies 
With its new threshold standard of review, and its 
sweeping critique of the Turner standard, the Johnson decision 
may have profound effects on prisoner rights litigation. 
Advocates may escape the Turner deferential test by arguing 
that, similar to Johnson, a prison policy should not be 
evaluated under Turner.  This type of argument is particularly 
salient for abortion rights advocates because the considerations 
which compelled the Court to not apply Turner to the racial 
segregation policies in Johnson are as, if not more, pertinent to 
prison abortion policies.  
  
 239 Id. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”). 
 240 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (noting that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits “torture” and “unnecessary cruelty”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to 
protect prisoners from barbaric forms of punishment). 
 241 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) (noting that the original 
draftsmen of the Eighth Amendment were primarily concerned with proscribing 
torture).  Unless, of course, these prisoners are “enemy combatants” in the war on 
terror.  (Author’s aside).  
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First, Turner should not apply to abortion policies in 
prison because the right to have an abortion is not, as the 
Court required in Johnson, “inconsistent with incarceration,”242 
and allowing an inmate to receive an abortion is more 
consistent with the penological goals of prisons. In Johnson, 
the Supreme Court made a surprising pronouncement that will 
have a fundamental effect on the way future prisoner rights 
cases will be litigated: “[W]e have applied Turner’s reasonable-
relationship test only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with 
proper incarceration.’”243 The right not to be discriminated 
against on the basis of race, the Court continued, “is not a right 
that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper 
prison administration. On the contrary, compliance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not 
only consistent with proper prison administration, but also 
bolsters the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”244 As 
Justice Thomas noted in dissent, this test eviscerates Turner 
by instructing courts to first ask whether the right need 
necessarily be compromised, rather than later asking whether 
there is simply a reasonable link between the policy and a 
penological interest.245  
It is clear that prohibiting female inmates from 
obtaining abortions, or creating delays that would hinder the 
exercise of this right, is not necessary for proper prison 
administration. As in Monmouth and Victoria W., a prison 
administration may argue against allowing an abortion 
because of the prison’s interests in ensuring security, reducing 
liability, or maintaining prison resources.246 Restrictive 
abortion policies are inconsistent with incarceration, however, 
because these asserted interests are not served by delaying or 
denying inmates’ their abortion rights.   
The prison’s claim that allowing abortions reduces 
prison resources is indefensible because the prison could allow 
abortions but ask that the inmate pay for the procedure and 
transportation themselves, something the inmate in the 
  
 242 See Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005). 
 243 Id. (emphasis in original).  
 244 Id.  
 245 Id. at 1167-68.  
 246 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 486 (5th Cir. 2004) (where the 
prison’s interests were inmate security and avoidance of liability); Monmouth County 
Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 336 (3d Cir. 1987) (where the prison’s 
interests were administrative and financial burdens on the prison). 
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Victoria W. case repeatedly offered to do.247  Second, prohibiting 
abortions actually increases costs and security concerns for the 
prison.  Under the Eighth Amendment the prison must pay for 
the pre-natal care and birth of a baby.248  This raises costs for 
the prison and for the state substantially. In addition, the 
transportation and security risks are higher for a woman to 
give birth, because she will be transferred to a hospital for pre-
natal care and labor far more times than is necessary for one 
abortion procedure.  
Furthermore, the costs to the inmate, to society and to 
the state are higher when an inmate is denied an abortion.  A 
child’s transfer to foster care, either with relatives or an 
unrelated family, is a state expense until the child is eighteen 
years old. In addition, an inmate’s trauma from giving up her 
baby, and then likely losing her parental rights if she is 
incarcerated more then eighteen months, may cost more to the 
prison in counseling and security, and is antithetical to the 
purpose of rehabilitating inmates.  
Allowing prisons to deny inmate abortions raises the 
question of the purposes of incarceration and the penological 
objectives of the prison system as a whole.249 Although inmates 
are punished for committing crimes, or are incarcerated for 
rehabilitation, prohibiting abortions achieves neither of these 
two objectives.  First, there is no rehabilitative goal advanced 
in forcing a woman to give birth against her will.  Second, this 
type of punishment does not comport with any possible theory 
of the correct punishment for inmates. It is a particularly 
gendered punishment, affecting only women and their bodies, 
that goes beyond the purpose of prisons.   
The second reason that Turner should not be used to 
evaluate abortion policies is that, as stated in Johnson, the 
standard is too lenient to ensure that a prison policy is not 
furthering an illegitimate purpose, a consideration that is 
particularly important with regard to abortion rights.  
In Johnson, the Supreme Court noted that they have 
historically been skeptical of racial discrimination, even 
“benign” discrimination, because “racial classifications raise 
special fears that they are motivated by an invidious 
  
 247 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7-9, Victoria W. (No. 02-30598). 
 248 Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), prisons are required to 
provide adequate medical care to prisoners and this includes paying for and providing 
prenatal care and birthing care for female inmates.  
 249 See Herman, supra note 19, at 1233-34.  
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purpose.”250  Therefore, the Johnson court found, “Turner is too 
lenient a standard to ferret out invidious uses of race.”251   “In 
the prison context, when the government’s power is at its apex, 
we think that searching judicial review of racial classifications 
is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination.”252  The 
Turner standard, the Court noted, would allow officials to use 
invidious policies when they don’t advance any goal, or when 
there are race-neutral ways of accomplishing the same goal.253   
The Supreme Court should be similarly concerned that 
the Turner standard would allow for unfettered restrictions on 
abortion based on ideological, and not penological, goals. The 
burden that the Turner test places on the inmate to prove that 
allowing abortion would never compromise penological goals is 
too high, and it allows prison officials unfettered ability to 
restrict abortion.254  The Court found this type of power too 
unrestricted when it comes to racial segregation. Similarly, 
because of the controversial nature of the right to abortion, 
Turner is too lenient a standard to ensure that prison policies 
are not motivated by personal or state opposition to abortion. 
Despite, and even because of, the controversial nature of the 
right to abortion, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld 
an adult woman’s autonomy in making the abortion decision, 
disallowing a veto by any other actor.255 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose 
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual 
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. 
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the state 
  
 250 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 251 Id. at 1151.  
 252 Id. at 1150.  
 253 Id. at 1151. 
 254 As noted in Part III, the Turner standard only asks whether the connection 
between the penological interest and the restriction was “arbitrary and irrational,” 
which means the prison must barely justify the reasons for its policy.  Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); see also Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1119 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“nothing in the decision’s holding requires the 
prison to justify the policy in any real fashion.”).  In addition, the fourth prong of the 
Turner test places the burden on the inmate to show that an alternative policy would 
accommodate her rights at “de minimis” cost to penological interests.  Turner, 482 U.S. 
at 91.  Under this prong, the inmate must prove that every alternative she proposes 
would not in any way effect security or prison resources, an insurmountable burden. 
 255 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (finding a state may not permit 
another person to veto a woman’s decision to have an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (striking down the spousal notification requirements).  
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can resolve these philosophic decisions in such a definitive way that 
a woman lacks all choice in the matter.256  
In fact, even though the Supreme Court has upheld 
legislation requiring parental consent of a minor’s decision to 
have an abortion, it has found that the state must provide an 
alternative to the consent in the form of a “judicial bypass 
procedure,” if the minor can show she is mature enough to 
make the decision or that the abortion would be in her best 
interest.257  Under the Turner standard, even adult female 
inmates are not given this kind of emergency bypass to a prison 
administrator’s veto over her abortion decision.  
Decisions on whether to allow abortions are made by 
prison officials and wardens who are by and large male; they 
therefore may not have the best interests of the female inmate 
in mind when creating abortion policy.258  Officials personally 
opposed to abortion may mask their beliefs behind 
unsubstantiated rationales for these policies. For example, a 
prison official might announce that no inmates could obtain 
abortions because carrying the child to term was more 
rehabilitative to women.  
In addition, Turner allows prison officials to create 
restrictive abortion policies even when they don’t advance any 
real penological goal, or when there are other ways of 
accomplishing the same goal while guarding an inmate’s 
abortion rights. Under Turner, there would be no distinct 
analysis of a policy that denies an abortion to a victim of rape 
by guards; an inmate who was in a late stage of her pregnancy 
and needed an expedited track; an inmate on death row or 
administrative isolation; or an inmate in a medium or 
maximum security prison who is not permitted release on 
  
 256 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 (“We forthwith 
acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion 
controversy.”). 
 257 Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). 
 258 See discussion infra Part II (description of judges’ and prison 
administrators’ categorical denial of inmate abortion rights); See also discussion infra 
Part IV (discussion of the Victoria W. court’s definition of abortion as “elective” and not 
a “serious medical need,” made by three male circuit court judges.).  See also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
441, 458 (1999) (arguing that aggressive judicial review of prisons is essential, because 
serious abuses of power can occur in prisons systems and the political process may not 
protect inmates’ rights).  
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furlough.  If the policy were reasonably related to a penological 
interest, all inmates could be subject to the same policy.259  
Although the Turner standard was meant to allow 
prisons to “anticipate security problems and . . . adopt 
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison 
administration,”260 the test should not give prisons a carte 
blanche to reject all alternatives, even ones that clearly allow 
abortion rights with a minimum cost to prison goals.  The 
Turner standard allows states to create an exception to the 
Supreme Court’s long-established abortion rights jurisprudence 
via their prison administration. Although the Supreme Court 
has consistently found restrictions such as parental consent,261 
informed consent requirements,262 reporting and record-keeping 
requirements263 and twenty-four hour waiting periods264 
constitutionally valid, it has never endorsed an outright denial 
of abortion for anyone, not even minors, and has always 
required a consideration of the health of the woman.265 Courts 
should not be able to carve a prison exception into the Supreme 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence in this way. 
VI.  A BETTER SOLUTION: EVALUATING PRISON ABORTION 
POLICIES UNDER CASEY  
When considering whether a prison’s restrictive 
abortion policy is constitutional, courts should not apply the 
Turner deferential standard.  If courts reviewed abortion 
policies under the Casey “undue burden” standard, this would 
give deference to prison officials to maintain their penological 
interests, while still comporting with the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, which prohibits regulations that place 
an undue burden on the right to choose, and protects the life 
  
 259 Justice Brennan criticized the Turner standard similarly in a dissent in 
the Shabazz case, saying that the standard did not consider degrees of rights 
deprivation, instead analyzing all restrictions on constitutional rights under the same 
four factors.  Under this type of scheme, “restricting use of the prison library to certain 
hours warrants the same level of scrutiny as preventing inmates from reading at all.”  
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 260 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  
 261 Baird, 443 U.S. at 622, 649.  
 262 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 
(1976).   
 263 Casey, 505 U.S. at 901; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80.  
 264 Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.  
 265 See id. at 885-86, 889-94.  
2006] PRISON ABORTION POLICIES 1329 
and health of the woman.266 This type of protection of an 
inmate’s reproductive rights would be significantly greater 
than allowing inmates to be subject to the whim of prison 
administrators in making their abortion decisions.  
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973 under Roe, the 
Supreme Court has continuously upheld state and federal laws 
that put restrictions on a woman’s right to choose abortion.  
The Casey “undue burden” standard allows states to restrict 
abortion as long as state law does not have the purpose or 
effect of placing a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking to abort a non-viable fetus.267  Despite rigorous efforts 
by reproductive rights advocates, the Casey standard allows for 
numerous restrictions that significantly affect the abortion 
rights of many women and girls.  For example, under Casey, 
states may impose an informed consent and twenty-four hour 
waiting period, parental consent requirements for minors with 
a judicial bypass exception, and recording and reporting of 
abortions by all providers.268  In addition, under Harris v. 
McRae, states may forbid the use of public funds for abortion, 
eliminating access for governmental employees and Medicaid 
recipients.269 
If prison abortion policies were evaluated under the 
Casey undue burden test, the Supreme Court would allow 
prisons to regulate abortion rights in a way that benefits state 
(i.e. prison) interests, as long as the prison does not place an 
undue burden on an inmate’s right to choose.  This would mean 
that prisons could require recording and reporting of all 
abortions, could impose minor delays on obtaining the 
procedure, could require parental consent with a judicial 
bypass procedure for minors, and would not have to provide 
prison resources for abortion.  Under Casey the prison could 
not, however, unconditionally deny prisoners abortions, nor 
impose delays that effectively deny women the right to choose. 
These types of restrictions could easily comport with a prison’s 
asserted need to maintain security, deterrence of crime and the 
rehabilitation of prisoners. 
  
 266 The author of this Note does not agree with the restrictions on abortion 
rights that are in place as a result of current Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence, 
but only argues that it may provide more protection from infringement on reproductive 
rights than the Turner deferential test. 
 267 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 268 Id. at 879-902.  
 269 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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For example, if the Victoria W. court evaluated the 
prison abortion policy under the Casey undue burden standard, 
they could still defer to the prison’s interests of inmate security 
and avoidance of liability while better protecting inmate’s 
abortion rights. In Victoria’s case, the court order requirement 
caused a delay of more than five weeks before Victoria saw a 
judge.270  The Victoria W. court, however, emphasized that the 
policy allowed the prison to focus on every off-prison transfer, 
each of which compromised security and increased prison 
liability.271  Under the Casey standard, the prison could still 
monitor inmate abortions, but it would have to prove that this 
did not present a “substantial obstacle” to a woman’s right to 
choose.272  The prison could still require that an inmate file a 
request and wait for approval from prison administrators, 
which would serve the state’s interests in security and 
avoidance of liability. The prison could not, however, allow the 
procedure to be categorically denied to any inmate, nor could it 
unduly delay abortions.  Because the inmate has no other 
avenue by which to obtain an abortion, the prison would be 
required to have procedures that regulate abortion transfers, 
while still allowing for expediency. Forcing an inmate to wait 
five weeks for an abortion would be seen as an undue burden 
on a woman’s right to choose.273 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As the Victoria W. and Monmouth cases illustrate, the 
Turner deferential standard may be applied arbitrarily and 
illogically, with harsh results for female inmates seeking to 
terminate their pregnancies. Application of the Turner 
  
 270 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 445, 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2004) (Victoria 
first requested an abortion on July 28, 1999 and was taken to get her court order on 
September 8th.  Granted, twelve days of this delay may have been caused by the moral 
apprehension of Victoria’s attorney.  However, the first two weeks of delay were caused 
by the prison.  In addition, because Victoria was a charge of the state and had no 
outside avenue for obtaining an abortion, the fact that the prison had no alternative or 
expedited way to obtain an abortion created an undue delay on her right to choose.).  
 271 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 486.  
 272 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. It might be argued that a court order requirement 
would be unconstitutional as applied to adult inmates, since the Supreme Court has 
only required a court order for minor children requesting abortions without the consent 
of their parents.  See id. at 889.  The reason given for these parental consent laws with 
judicial bypass is to encourage children to consult with their parents.  Id.  It is unclear 
why adult inmates should be required to ask a judge for permission to get an abortion.  
 273 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (The court found that the burden on women 
caused by a twenty-four hour delay was “troubling in some respects.”). 
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standard to prison abortion policies is unconstitutional, 
because it may allow prisons to drastically delay or 
categorically deny inmates the right to terminate their 
pregnancies.  Therefore, the Turner standard must not be 
applied in evaluating prison abortion policies.  Turner should 
not be applied because abortion is more similar to rights not 
evaluated under Turner and less similar to rights that are, and 
because the same considerations that compelled the Supreme 
Court to not apply Turner to Johnson v. California are 
pertinent to inmate abortion policies. If courts applied the 
Casey “undue burden” standard to prison abortion cases, they 
would safeguard a woman’s right to choose abortion, while 
allowing prisons to guard their penological interests 
simultaneously.  
Exploring the applicability of the Turner deferential 
standard to abortion rights raises fundamental questions about 
the nature of punishment in prison. With courts allowing for 
more deference to prison administrators, how far may prisons 
extend punishment of inmates before they are prevented from 
doing so by the judiciary? Would the courts allow a prison to 
have a policy that denied abortion rights to every inmate under 
any circumstances?  
The Supreme Court has recognized that courts are ill-
equipped to deal with the urgent problems of prison 
administration and reform.274  As prisons grow larger and 
punishments more severe, however, it is important for courts to 
continue asking whether a punishment is really necessary for a 
prisons’ penological goal.  The new Johnson standard, which 
asks whether a right need necessarily be curtailed, does just 
that. As this Note has demonstrated, restriction or denial of 
abortion rights is a form of punishment that should not be a 
part of an inmate’s sentence.  In fact, prison abortion policies 
are yet another way that abortion foes restrict reproductive 
rights for women who are most marginalized in our society- 
those who are in prison.  Therefore, it is up to the courts to 
protect the abortion rights of female inmates, and not applying  
  
 274 Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 
(1974).  
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the Turner deferential standard to abortion policies is an 
important step in the right direction.  
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